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Abstract :  The crossing of the 
Canal du Nord stands as one of 
the most impressive Canadian 
tactical operations of the First World 
War. Incorporating a risky battle 
plan, emphasizing combined arms 
operations and utilizing the recently 
re-organized Canadian Engineers, the 
battle stands as a benchmark for the 
evolution of 20th century combat. 
Although sustaining high casualties, 
the Canadian Corps overcame one 
of the strongest German defensive 
positions along the Western Front in 
an operation that foreshadowed the 
mobile, combined arms doctrine of 
the Second World War.
Th e  F i r s t  W o r l d  W a r  h a s traditionally been viewed as 
a tactically stagnant conflict that 
resulted in extremely high casualties 
with very little battlefield success. 
Although this notion is generally 
accurate for the first half of the 
war, recent scholarship suggests 
it is incorrect when studying the 
events of 1917 and 1918.1 By that 
time, after several years of doctrinal 
development, the Allied armies 
had at their disposal sufficiently 
trained and well prepared formations 
under proven commanders that 
overcame highly complex German 
defences. Within the Allied armies, 
the Canadian Corps was regarded as 
an elite formation and spearheaded 
major offensives during the last year 
of the war.
 The crossing of the Canal du 
Nord in late September 1918 was the 
Canadian Corps’ greatest tactical 
achievement even though it has been 
overshadowed by the better known 
successes at Vimy Ridge in 1917 and 
at Amiens and the Drocourt-Quéant 
(D-Q) line in 1918. The Canal du 
Nord operation was a sophisticated 
combined-arms assault in which 
engineer, artillery and infantry units 
were seamlessly integrated. Indeed, 
the crossing of the canal represented 
a skilful application of the combined 
arms tactics developed in the trenches 
to semi-open warfare – a tactical 
model that came to full fruition on 
the battlefields of the Second World 
War. Some view the daring and 
unorthodox plan as the “operational 
masterpiece” of Lieutenant-General 
Sir Arthur Currie, the culmination 
of his inspired battlefield leadership. 
He had taken command of the corps 
in June 1917 and, in the victories at 
Hill 70 and Passchendaele during the 
summer and fall of that year, together 
with rigorous training and innovative 
changes in organization in 1918, 
further honed the formidable striking 
power the formation had achieved 
under its previous commander, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng.2 
 Starting in March 1918 the 
Germans launched a series of major 
offensives which cut deep salients into 
Allied territory. The assaults failed in 
their strategic goal of breaking the 
ability of the Allied armies to mount 
an organized defence, and exhausted 
the German army in the process. 
By August the Allies were ready 
to respond with a counteroffensive 
which became known as the Hundred 
Days. Essentially, the campaign 
was a series of loosely coordinated 
offensives launched by American, 
British and French armies against 
the over-extended German lines. 
Beginning with the Battle of Amiens 
on 8 August 1918, in which the 
Canadian Corps led the British 
armies, the Hundred Days became 
a succession of Allied victories that 
inflicted heavy losses on the German 
forces and undermined their morale. 
This campaign led directly to the 
German call for peace negotiations 
and the armistice of 11 November. 
For the Canadians, the Hundred 
Days was one of the most successful 
but also tragically costly periods in 
Canadian military history.3 
 In September 1918 the Germans 
positioned themselves along the 
Hindenburg line, their heavily 
defended and final line of defence. 
Field Marshal Earl Haig, commander-
in-chief of the British Expeditionary 
Force, and French Field Marshal 
Ferdinand Foch, supreme commander 
of the Allied armies, agreed upon a 
front-wide general assault including 
American, Belgian, French and British 
army groups. General Henry Horne’s 
British First Army, which included 
the Canadian Corps, was instructed 
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to capture Cambrai in conjunction 
with General Byng’s Third Army. 
The capture of the city would secure 
the Third Army’s left flank and deny 
the Germans their northern railway 
nexus. “It would have been difficult to 
overstate the importance of Cambrai 
to its German defenders,”4 concluded 
historian Shane Schreiber; it was 
the centre for the German logistical 
system in the Flanders theatre. 
Cambrai’s importance was already 
well known to British high command 
as the city was the springboard for 
a German counterattack in 1917 
that turned a BEF victory into a 
serious defeat. According to historian 
Daniel Dancocks, “There was no 
doubt that the Germans would 
defend Cambrai with ruthless, even 
fanatical determination; its loss 
would be disastrous for the enemy 
because it would render the rest of the 
Hindenburg line untenable.”5 
 In order to get to Cambrai, 
however, the Canal du Nord, to 
the west of the city, would have 
to be crossed and the heights of 
Bourlon Wood, which commanded 
the eastern bank of the canal, taken. 
Second Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
one of the formations involved 
in the operation, observed: “The 
capture of the Bourlon wood and 
high ground to the north and east 
of it were conditions precedent to 
the success of the major operation. 
For the advance of troops south of 
Bourlon wood would have meant a 
flank open to hostile attack, which 
developing, must have imperilled 
the whole enterprise.”6 Thus the 
Canadian Corps was tasked with 
capturing one of the most threatening 
positions along the German line.
 The canal provided the Germans 
with a natural defensive obstacle. 
They had flooded most of the area in 
the Canadian Corps sector increasing 
the difficulty of crossing. As Currie 
pointed out, traversing the canal 
would be difficult enough, even 
without the well prepared German 
defensive measures, 
The Canal du Nord…was under 
construction at the outbreak of the 
war and had not been completed. 
Generally speaking, it followed 
the valley of the River Agache, but 
not the actual bed of the river. The 
average width was about 100 feet 
and it was flooded as far south as 
the lock, 800 yards south-west of 
Sains-lez-Marquion, just north of the 
Corps southern boundary. South of 
this and to the right of the Corps front 
the Canal was dry, and its bottom 
was at the natural ground level, the 
sides of the Canal consisting of high 
earth and brick banks.7
 German defences covered the 
eastern bank of the canal with 
machine guns and this was further 
reinforced by the well constructed and 
heavily-wired canal defence line. As 
G.W.L. Nicholson, official historian 
of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
observed: “Air photographs revealed 
that its [the canal defence line] main 
strength lay in its dense barricade of 
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wire.”8 Farther back and parallel to 
the canal was another heavily wired 
defensive network, the Marquion 
Line, and behind that stood the 
imposing heights of Bourlon Wood 
a position which was “difficult to 
assess from air photographs because 
of the foliage still on its magnificent 
oak trees…But the ground between 
the wood and the Marquion Line 
was dotted with old excavations, 
dug-outs and shelters, all of them 
potential machine-gun sites.”9 It was 
hard to fathom that after overcoming 
two heavily defended positions the 
Canadians would then be expected 
to assault a dense forested area on 
high ground.
 The impossibility of crossing 
the canal in the northern half of 
the corps sector created one of the 
most perplexing tactical dilemmas 
Currie had ever faced. Nearly the 
entire length of the canal facing the 
Canadian front was impassable due 
to flooding and areas not flooded 
were reinforced by strong German 
defences. Dismissing the option of a 
costly frontal assault, Currie decided 
to extend his southern boundary and 
attack through a narrow, dry stretch 
of the canal, intending to overwhelm 
the German flank. In his words, “The 
Corps had, therefore, to cross the 
canal on a front of 2,600 yards and 
expand fanwise in a north-easterly 
direction to a front exceeding 15,000 
yards.”10 What further persuaded 
Currie to attack through this portion 
of the canal was the fact that only 
eight of the 21 German divisions in 
the area were in this sector, compared 
to 13 divisions farther north.11 He had 
pinpointed the weakest link in the 
German defensive chain and decided 
to exploit it.
 The 2,600-yard dry stretch of 
the canal that Currie proposed to 
cross was an extremely narrow front 
for a corps-strength attack. Currie’s 
plan was to side-step the corps into 
this narrow gap, punch through 
with two divisions and then exploit 
the gap with two fresh divisions to 
Moeuvres
Sains-lez-Marquion
Taken nearly a year before the battle (2 November 1917) this oblique air photo shows the dry bed of the Canal du Nord as it snakes 
past Moeuvres towards Sains-lez-Marquion. The zig-zag lines of trenches are only the most visible part of the formidable defences 
on either side of the canal.
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fan out and cover the 15,000 yard 
frontage he intended to command 
on the far side of the canal.12 Currie 
would need to position all of his 
attacking troops into one small area. 
According to conventional military 
doctrine, this plan was risky at best, 
disastrous at worst. That worried 
Currie intensely: “The assembly of 
the attacking troops in an extremely 
congested area known by the enemy 
to be the only one available was 
very dangerous, especially in view 
of the alertness of the enemy. A 
concentrated bombardment of this 
area prior to zero, particularly if 
gas was employed, was a dreaded 
possibility which could seriously 
affect the whole of the operation 
and possibly cause its total failure.”13 
There was a chilling premonition of 
what could happen on 26 September. 
While troops of 12th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade (CIB) waited to 
board trains to take them to the front 
“a bombing attack was carried out 
by hostile aircraft which resulted in 
casualties amounting to 2 officers, 123 
other ranks.”14
 The difficulties inherent in 
Currie’s operational plan disturbed 
his superior officer, General Horne, 
who recommended alterations. 
According to Shane Schreiber, when 
Currie adamantly refused to alter 
his program Horne went to the 
BEF commander, Field Marshal 
Haig. Haig, trusting in Currie’s 
competence, sided with the corps 
commander. Horne’s doubts were 
undiminished and he approached 
Currie’s old commander, Julian 
Byng, now commanding Third Army, 
to request that Byng attempt to 
persuade Currie to alter his plan. 
Schreiber describes Byng and 
Currie’s meeting: “After inspecting 
Currie’s plan, Byng commented to 
the Canadian, ‘Do you realise that 
you are attempting one of the most 
difficult operations of the war? If 
anybody can do it, the Canadians can 
do it, but if you fail, it means home for 
you.’ Currie remained undaunted.”15 
His plan remained unchanged. It is 
interesting to note that this debate 
is not mentioned in either the recent 
biography on General Horne, The 
Silent General by Don Farr, or The 
Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie 
edited by Mark Humphries.16 Farr, 
in fact, devotes a couple of pages to 
the relationship between Horne and 
Currie citing three occasions when 
they clashed, but does not mention 
the tactical debate prior to the attack 
on the Canal du Nord. 
 On 22 September, headquarters 
assigned a third primary objective 
for Currie’s corps, the high ground 
east of Cambrai and overlooking the 
Canal de l’Escaut. Currie adapted 
to these last minute additions and 
broke the assault into two phases. 
He set the first phase objectives as 
the Canal du Nord and the seizure 
of Bourlon Wood. The second phase 
would be the capture of the bridges 
over the Canal de l’Escaut and the 
high ground near Cambrai. The 1st 
Canadian Division, led by Major-
General Archibald Macdonell, would 
lead the first phase of the attack, 
rolling up the Marquion Line along 
its flank from south to north. At the 
same time, the 4th Canadian Division, 
led by Major-General David Watson, 
would seize Bourlon Wood leaving 
the centre to be mopped up later. 
After the phase one objectives were 
taken, the 3rd Canadian Division, led 
by newly-appointed Major-General 
Frederick Loomis, and the British 
11th Division, would cross the Canal 
du Nord and push on towards their 
phase two objectives.17 General Henry 
Burstall’s 2nd Canadian Division was 
to be kept in reserve.
 C u r r i e  d e s i g n a t e d  t h r e e 
intermediate objective lines for the 
first phase of the attack on the 27th. 
The Red Line, which was to be taken 
first, included the Canal du Nord 
and the Marquion Line defences. The 
Green Line, 1,500 yards further east, 
was to be taken next and included 
Bourlon village. A further 2,000 yard 
advance would put the Canadians at 
the Blue line and in possession of the 
remainder of Bourlon Wood.
 The attack was scheduled for 
the morning of 27 September and 
the night before was one of sleepless 
tension. In Currie’s words: “This was 
for everybody a night full of anxiety, 
but apart from the usual harassing 
fire and night bombing nothing 
untoward happened.”18 Historian 
A.M.J Hyatt described the scene that 
evening:
T h e  i n f a n t r y ,  b u n c h e d  i n t o 
the  crowded assembly areas 
and oppressed by the fear of a 
routine enemy barrage on their 
dangerously dense numbers, waited 
apprehensively for zero hour. Rain 
began to fall and the cold ground 
became slippery, adding to the 
difficulty of the coming assault… 
the darkness of the sky remained 
ominous. Suddenly, at 5.20 a.m. the 
stillness and tension were shattered 
by the sickening crash of the creeping 
barrage and the infantry began 
moving forward.19
Canon Frederick Scott, a chaplain in 
the 1st Division, was awestruck by 
the artillery barrage that morning: 
“At 5.20 the savage roar burst forth. It 
was a stupendous attack. Field guns, 
heavy guns, and siege batteries sent 
forth their fury, and machine guns 
poured millions of rounds into the 
country beyond the Canal.”20 Under 
the protection of the artillery, the 
infantry moved forward virtually 
unmolested across the canal. Once 
through the gap the forward units 
fanned out, each one forcing its way 
towards its objectives. 
This air photo mosaic, taken by the RAF 
at the beginning of September 1918, 
shows the sector of the Canal du Nord 
assaulted by the Canadian Corps on the 
morning of 27 September. A close look 
at the image shows the depth of the 
German defences: trenches are clearly 
visible and wire is visible as dark bands 
marked as “x x x x x.”
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Canadians moving forward into attack on Cambrai.
 The 4th Division had the most 
important task in capturing Bourlon 
Wood. If left in the hands of the 
Germans it would provide a strong 
position to mount a counterattack 
directly into the f lank of  the 
Canadian Corps. This could cut 
off any possibility of retreat and 
prevent any further advance towards 
Cambrai. Major-General Watson 
led his attack with 10th CIB, while 
11th and 12th CIBs were to leap frog 
and envelop the German defences 
with a pincer movement. Brigadier-
General Lord Brooke’s 12th Brigade 
was given the left while the 11th 
Brigade under Brigadier-General 
Victor Odlum was the right arm of 
this pincer movement. Brooke was 
able to achieve his objectives but 
Odlum’s brigade became caught in 
enfilade fire from its flank and “the 
right battalion suffered considerable 
casualties from art. and m. guns firing 
from the high ground in front of 
Bourlon Wood…”21 The British 52nd 
Division, which was to support the 
corps’ right flank, and thus the 4th 
Division, was unable to keep pace 
and left Odlum’s brigade vulnerable 
to vicious flanking fire. Unable 
to advance any further, Odlum 
established a line to protect the 
right flank of the corps. Fortunately, 
12th Brigade captured “…the Blue 
objective practically along the entire 
divisional front…” highlighted by 
the actions of Lieutenant McKnight 
and Private Graham who “took a 
Lewis gun and dashed across the 
open under heavy machine gun fire 
and took up a position enfilading the 
enemy, causing about 50 of them to 
surrender.”22 The success of 12th CIB 
allowed 4th Division to consolidate 
its hold on Bourlon Wood.23
 Stiff resistance was encountered 
by 1st Division, especially by 2nd 
CIB on the right, whose “time table 
barrage had passed the enemy’s 
resistance points” and thus “heavy 
shelling and a certain amount of 
machine gun fire were encountered…
all companies suffered casualties. 
As they advanced, they expanded 
into battle formation coming under 
heavy rifle and machine gun fire.”24 
Overcoming this opposition, 2nd CIB 
along with the rest of 1st Division, 
attacking along the corps’ left flank, 
carried out a spectacular assault 
capturing “all objectives in the first 
phase…all high ground within the 
Divisional boundaries.”25 At one 
point 1st Division was “fighting 
in four directions simultaneously: 
east, northeast, north and west.”26 
With the help of the British 11th 
Division, which reinforced exhausted 
Canadian units after the second 
phase, the division’s objectives were 
all reached by the end of the day. 
 By nightfall the Red, Green and 
Blue Lines had been reached but the 
second phase objectives, the Canal 
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Above: This air photo of Bourlon and Bourlon 
Wood was taken on 27 September 1918, the 
first day of the offensive and looks eastward 
from behind the Canadian front line. The 
village of Bourlon has been wrecked by the 
fighting of 1917-18.
Right: The ruins of Bourlon as they appeared 
in 1919. In the foreground is the shattered 
remains of a church while the heights of 
Bourlon Wood can be seen in the distance. 
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de l’Escaut and the heights near the 
city of Cambrai, were still held by the 
Germans, who were not idle. “[T]he 
enemy had gauged the strength of 
our advance,” in the words of the war 
diary of the 2nd CIB, “and had found 
courage…to cling to and reinforce 
his strong positions on the high 
ground…and at dusk was assembling 
in strong force and in excellent 
positions to dispute our further 
advance.”27 Thus the Canadian Corps 
became engaged in vicious fighting 
as the Germans counterattacked at 
a number of locations attempting to 
recapture the ground they had lost. 
For the next five days, tired Canadian 
soldiers pushed on towards the 
heights around Cambrai against 
well-entrenched German positions, 
“Enemy machine guns fired at point 
blank range. A perfect hell of bullets 
swept about them and yet they went 
against these wire entanglements 
and calmly commenced to tear a 
passage through them.”28 The war 
diary for 7th CIB reported “Heavy 
casualties resulted from machine 
gun fire…Opposition was strong 
and progress difficult.”29 The tenacity 
of the Canadian soldiers won out 
and by 1 October all the objectives 
designated by Currie were captured. 
 Currie recalled after the war 
that “In late September and early 
October, [the corps] fought the battle 
of Cambrai, and no position it ever 
assaulted offered more seemingly 
insurmountable difficulties.” 30 
In the five days of fighting from 
27 September to 1 October, the 
Canadians had taken 7,059 prisoners, 
and 205 guns. They had faced 
13 German divisions as well as 
numerous independent machine 
gun units. As Currie stated, “We 
had gone through the last organized 
system of defences on our front, and 
our advance constituted a direct 
threat on the rear of the [German] 
troops immediately to the north of 
our left flank, and their withdrawal 
had now begun.”31 Although the 
city of Cambrai was still in German 
hands at the beginning of October, 
their primary defence lines were 
over run and it was only a matter 
of time before an Allied attack on 
Cambrai was launched. The capture 
of Cambrai on 11 October marked 
the end of the successful battle of 
Arras-Cambrai. For Arthur Currie, 
in the assessment of historian Shane 
Schreiber, “the Canal du Nord was 
his operational masterpiece, the 
culmination of his education as a 
general.”32 
 The extensive preparation and 
synchronized actions of the various 
branches in the Canadian Corps 
resulted in the stunning tactical 
victory at the Canal du Nord. The 
Canadian Corps operated as a semi-
autonomous unit within the British 
Expeditionary Force. Firstly, the 
Canadian Corps did not ultimately 
answer to the British Government 
but to the Canadian Government. 
The Canadian Corps was represented 
in London by the Ministry of 
Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 
a full-fledged department of the 
government of Canada. Furthermore, 
there was a Canadian Section at 
British General Headquarters that 
acted as a liaison for the Canadian 
ministry and the Canadian Corps. 
Most important, Currie “had both 
the right and the duty to exercise a de 
facto veto over what Haig and British 
Army Commanders could or could 
not ask the Canadian Corps to do.”33
 This semi-autonomous status 
allowed the corps to be organized 
differently from other BEF corps. 
In 1918 a Canadian division’s three 
brigades still had four infantry 
battalions each, for a total of 12, 
whereas the British, because of 
manpower shortages, had reduced 
their brigades to three battalions, for a 
total of only nine in each division. As 
well, a Canadian division contained 
an entire engineer brigade consisting 
of roughly 3,000 men, whereas a 
British division contained only an 
engineer battalion of around 700 men. 
A further significant difference was in 
firepower. A Canadian division had 
an average of one automatic weapon 
for every 13 soldiers, whereas a 
British division had one automatic 
weapon for every 61 soldiers.34
 The Canadian Corps was also 
stronger in artillery than an average 
British corps. The corps had gained 
two extra field artillery brigades in 
August 1917 from the 5th Canadian 
Canadian trucks pass through Marquion 
as they transport shells to the guns, 
September 1918.
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Division organizing in England, 
which was ultimately disbanded 
early in 1918 in order to reinforce 
and strengthen the existing corps, as 
has been described above. The British 
urged Canada to field additional 
divisions, but Currie insisted the 
strengthening of the existing, proven 
divisions was a far wiser use of 
increasingly strained manpower 
resources than inflating the size of 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
to a level where it would be forced to 
trim battalions as the British had done 
at the expense of fighting power. 
From the 5th Division the corps also 
acquired additional heavy trench 
mortar batteries, for a total of four, 
one per division, as compared to 
only one battery per corps in British 
formations. The fact that the Canadian 
Corps fought as one homogenous 
unit, without divisions being shifted 
from corps to corps as was the case 
in the British and other armies, led 
to nearly seamless integration of the 
four divisional artillery units and 
those, including the heavy artillery, 
that were controlled at corps level. 
In the words of Brigadier A.G.L. 
McNaughton, one of the corps’ senior 
artillery officers, “During the battle 
we…organized and fought as a corps, 
with the result that the whole force 
of our artillery within range was 
immediately available to support any 
sector.”35
 In essence,  each Canadian 
division could act like a small BEF 
corps and the Canadian Corps could 
perform at the level of a small BEF 
army. The heavier firepower and 
greater manpower available to the 
Canadian Corps, as well as the 
numerous ancillary units available 
at the divisional and corps level, 
provided Currie with a highly potent 
and flexible fighting force. With its 
proven leadership, intense training, 
and the instinctual cooperation 
that grew from the stable, closely 
knit composition of the corps, the 
Canadians became an elite formation 
within the BEF.36
* * * * *
The crossing of the Canal du Nord would never have succeeded 
without the engineers. In fact, the 
extensive and effective use of the 
engineers in this battle is what marks 
it as such a unique First World 
War action. Historian Bill Rawling 
argues that “the operation became a 
foreshadowing of the next war, when 
engineers in many theatres would be 
hard pressed to keep tanks, artillery 
and truck borne infantry moving over 
rivers and rough terrain.”37 
 Prior to 1918, engineer units 
within the Canadian Corps were of 
the same size and employed in the 
same manner as those of a British 
corps. Standard practice was to 
utilize infantry units in reserve 
as the manual labour in engineer 
projects. Often this would mean 
soldiers fighting a battle one day and 
performing heavy manual labour 
the next. What further complicated 
matters was that the engineers did 
not have direct control over their 
labour force, since these soldiers 
were still under the control of their 
commanding officer who could 
remove them from work at any given 
moment.
 Currie’s chief engineer, Major-
General W.B. Lindsay, felt that 
the engineers could be expanded 
and reorganized to provide a more 
adequate labour force without 
the complications and hardships 
inherent in the employment of 
infantry battalions. He proposed an 
integration of the loosely connected 
f ie ld,  pioneer  and tunnel l ing 
companies into cohesive engineer 
brigades designed roughly along the 
lines of a standard infantry brigade, 
with a headquarters staff, three 
battalions and a bridging company. 
Currie was easily convinced of this 
plan and the reorganization was 
complete by July 1918. As Currie 
stated, “I am of the opinion that 
much of the success of the Canadian 
Corps in the final 100 days was due 
to the fact that they had sufficient 
engineers to do the engineering work 
and that in those closing battles we 
did not employ the infantry in that 
kind of work. We trained the infantry 
for fighting and used them only for 
fighting.”38 The crossing of Canal du 
Nord showcased the strength and 
efficiency of this new formation and 
as Dancocks argues, “No one worked 
Canadian engineers construct a bridge 
across the Canal du Nord, September 
1918.
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harder for victory on 27 September 
than the Canadian engineers.”39 
 The engineers performed feats 
at an unheard of rate and scale 
compared with previous allied action 
on the Western Front. They repaired 
18 miles of road and built seven miles 
of tramway lines in preparation for 
the battle. During the attack, the 
engineers constructed seven infantry 
bridges spanning the canal as well 
as ten larger bridges for artillery.40 
Transporting the artillery across the 
canal was a particularly challenging 
task as the artillery, in order to 
make room for the infantry in the 
severely constricted forward areas, 
was positioned farther back than 
usual. Soon after zero hour the guns 
would have to advance and get across 
the obstacle of the canal quickly in 
order to keep the objectives ahead 
of the infantry within range. The 
official history of Canada’s military 
engineers records how this was 
achieved: 
The Chief Engineer’s orders provided 
for a company from every forward 
C.E. brigade to be assigned to the 
duty of assisting the artillery to get 
their field-guns ahead, and a second 
company to construct foot-bridges 
for the infantry in accordance with 
the requirements of the divisional 
commander concerned. Special 
parties were assigned to move with 
the attacking troops to examine the 
ground for mines. Provision was also 
made for the other parties to follow 
immediately behind them to make 
rapid temporary repairs to cratered 
roads and damaged canal-crossing 
facilities.41
By 0800 hours on 27 September the 
first batteries crossed the canal. 
Specially trained teams constructed 
two 110-foot steel bridges that were 
operational by 28 September.
 The work of the 3rd Battalion 
C a n a d i a n  E n g i n e e r s  ( C E ) , 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
E. Pepler, highlights one of the 
most complicated operations of 
the crossing. The 3rd Battalion was 
assigned the task of constructing most 
of the infantry and artillery crossings 
over the canal on 27 September. “C” 
Company went forward at zero 
hour with the infantry in order to 
set up four infantry bridges for the 
15th Canadian Infantry Battalion, 
two light transport bridges and two 
bridges over the Agache River. Under 
heavy machine gun and rifle fire the 
engineer units began construction 
on the four infantry bridges. After 
the completion of the first bridge, 
“Sapper J.E. Wyatt dashed across 
the bridge, shot one of the [German] 
machine gunners and captured two 
others with the same gun.”42 The 
following three infantry bridges were 
completed shortly thereafter and the 
first units of the 15th crossed the canal 
at 1000 hours. The eastern bank was 
then cleared of the remaining German 
troops allowing the engineers to 
begin construction of the pontoon 
and trestle bridges. 
 The material required for these 
large crossings was located in Inchy 
and once the infantry had secured 
the eastern bank of the canal a signal 
from the forward engineer officer was 
sent to the rear and the movement 
of the necessary materials began. 
The Germans, however, had blown 
a large crater in a section of the dry 
canal bed and units were required to 
repair this 30-foot-deep obstacle prior 
to the construction of the first artillery 
crossing:
Lieut. D. Justice and two sub-sections 
commenced work and made a road 
diversion around the crater, over 
which the field guns passed at 8:50 
Supply wagons cross the dry bed of the Canal du Nord as they move supplies to the front, September 1918.
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am. This party remained all day 
filling in the crater with material 
obtained close by and the road was 
ready for two-way traffic by 5:30pm. 
Heavy shelling was directed at this 
point at various times throughout the 
day, a shell landing in the crater itself. 
The crossing took practically all the 
traffic across the Canal throughout 
the day.43
Construction of one of the pontoon 
bridges was held up by the heavy 
shell fire and the commanding officer 
of this particular bridging company 
was the unit’s first casualty. The 
bridge was completed at 1835 hours 
and comprised three pontoons and 
two trestles spanning 60 feet.44
 Captain C.E. Whyte of “A” 
Company,  10th Battal ion,  CE 
described the construction of another 
crossing.45 Whyte split his company 
into an advanced section and a main 
section. The advanced party under 
Lieutenant Duckworth took up their 
forward positions at 0400 hours 
on the morning of 27 September 
carrying picks, shovels, wire cutters, 
sledgehammers, sand bags, a cross cut 
saw, a fuze and detonator, and a red 
flag to signal when a gap in the wire 
was cut. At 0530 hours the advanced 
party began removing barbed wire 
on the road west of the canal. As this 
occurred, a tank rolled past them 
through the wire and detonated 
two mines. The first one exploded 
under the tail of the tank inflicting 
little damage, however, the second 
mine “destroyed the left tractor belt 
putting it out of commission and 
completely blocking the gap [where 
construction was to begin].”46 The 
main party came forward and joined 
the work at 0800 hours, helping 
clear the area of further mines. Shell 
fire was intermittent and on two 
occasions “A” Company’s work 
was “interrupted by machine gun 
fire. Over 30 enemy were found in 
dugouts along the embankment and 
these were taken prisoner.”47 Whyte’s 
“A” Company eventually removed 
the destroyed tank and completed 
the crossing by 0930 hours. 
  Another task assigned to the 
engineers was escorting f ield 
artillery across the canal and into 
their advanced positions. “Special 
parties were detailed and allotted to 
the artillery for this purpose. These 
parties remained with the guns until 
they had crossed the canal, and were 
of material assistance in helping 
them over the roads that had been 
destroyed by shell fire.”48 An example 
of this cooperation can be found in 
the 3rd Battalion, CE war diary:
No. 3 sub-section reported to 5th 
battery…The battery did not move 
forward until 8:15 am following 
the low ground north of Inchy. 
The sappers went ahead of the 
Canadian engineers bridge a dry section of Canal du Nord, September 1918. Note the original 
bridge blown by the Germans in the background. Behind that is a concrete lock on the canal.
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battery and had to make a bridge 
over a small stream…There was 
considerable shelling here but the 
party and the battery crossed safely.49
 Other tasks for the engineers 
included road maintenance and 
consolidation of trenches and dugouts 
taken from the enemy (1st Battalion, 
CE), light railway maintenance 
(6th Battalion, CE), maintenance 
of water supply to the front (5th 
Battalion, CE) and construction of 
forward dugouts, headquarters 
and billets (4th Battalion, CE). In 
some instances a battalion carried 
out several different tasks as in the 
case of the 12th Battalion, CE whose 
companies simultaneously escorted 
artillery units, repaired roads, built 
a forward headquarters, and swept 
the village of Bourlon for mines.50 
 The corps’ orders for the Canal 
du Nord assault had underscored 
that the “success of the whole 
operation beyond the blue line 
depends on the speed with which 
the canal is bridged…this applies 
particularly to transport carrying 
bridge material which must be 
given priority on all roads.”51 In the 
event, the Germans destroyed every 
possible crossing during their retreat, 
increasing the difficulties facing the 
engineers. They were able to master 
the challenge in no small part because 
the organization of the engineer 
brigades made sufficient, dedicated 
manpower readily available. For 
Currie, the Canal du Nord vindicated 
his decision to create the formidable 
engineer organization: “The success…
was to a large extent due to the 
exertion and skill displayed by the 
Canadian Engineers in every branch 
of their activities, notably in bridge-
building and repair of roads.”52
 Another crucial component of 
victory at the Canal du Nord was 
the effective use of artillery. During 
the Hundred Days, over 73,000 
tons of Canadian ammunition was 
expended.53 As Lieutenant-Colonel 
McNaughton wrote, “I know of no 
organisation in the history of the 
War which was able to produce 
such a high ratio in shell to troops, 
nor any in which the price paid for 
victory was lower in personnel.”54 
For much of the first two years of the 
war, however, the artillery had been 
used in a preparatory role. Artillery 
batteries would unleash a heavy 
bombardment on the enemy trenches 
attempting to inflict casualties, soften 
up defensive positions and cut 
through barbed wire. The infantry 
would wait until the artillery barrage 
had lifted and then storm across no 
man’s land preparing to encounter 
destroyed German positions. 
 By the summer of 1916, in the 
Somme campaign the gunners were 
employing a “creeping barrage” 
technique. The artillery barrage 
moved through  the  enemy’s 
defensive positions according to a 
strict time schedule. As the artillery 
barrage “crept” along these positions, 
the infantry would advance, staying 
as close to the barrage as possible. 
“The creeping barrage was a vital 
innovation in Great War tactics 
because it represented a decisive shift 
from ‘destructive’ fire to ‘neutralizing’ 
fire.”55 The intended result was that 
the German defenders would have 
Cambrai as viewed from the Canadian front line, 1 October 1918. Note the dead soldier lying in the foreground.
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no time in between the lifting of the 
barrage and the infantry advance to 
rush from their dugouts and man 
their posts. The infantry would be 
upon the Germans immediately as 
the artillery lifted to the next target. 
“The idea of the barrage is to tie 
the enemy to the ground, to inflict 
casualties and to demoralize him 
and prevent his using his rifles, 
machine guns, trench mortars, etc., 
and to screen the advance of our 
infantry by a wall of bursting shell, 
and smoke and dust.”56 This result, 
however, required unheard of levels 
of precision in artillery fire, and in 
coordination between the artillery 
and the infantry, lest shells “fall 
short” into the infantry they were 
supposed to screen, or the barrage 
moved too quickly forward ahead of 
the infantry, allowing the enemy time 
to come up from his dugouts after the 
barrage passed, and fire, unmolested 
into the on-coming Allied infantry.
 The Canadians used a refined 
application of the creeping barrage 
with enormous success at the Battle 
of Vimy Ridge. These tactics, with 
the infantry “leaning” closely into a 
screen of fire delivered with precision 
by the gunners,  was standard 
throughout the Hundred Days. In the 
case of the Canal du Nord attack, the 
artillery firing plan allowed ample 
time for the infantry to make its way 
over the broken ground and thus 
keep close to the protective screen of 
shells: “The initial barrage will fall 
200 yards in front of the jumping off 
line where it will rest for 4 minutes 
and then make two lifts of 100 yards, 
3 minutes each, after which it will 
advance at the rate of 100 yards in 
4 minutes.”57A Canadian private 
described his first experience with 
this type of attack:
In extended order with few blanks 
they were following close behind a 
rolling barrage. The barrage showed 
up as a wall of smoke so perfect were 
the shells laid down that there were 
no gaps and the line was kept as 
straight as a die, as the saying goes. 
It showed the artillery at their very 
best. The movable wall of bursting 
shells outlined by smoke was a pretty 
sight to watch.58
 Currie was faced, however, with 
unusual difficulties in arranging 
artillery support for the crossing 
of the canal. The narrow attack 
frontage, as we have seen, displaced 
the artillery farther back than was 
normal for an attack. Furthermore, 
the extension of the front once across 
the canal entailed further challenges, 
both in moving the guns forward so 
that the could command the larger 
area, and accurately positioning 
the guns to carry out what was a 
substantially new fire plan for the 
more distant objectives. To keep 
pace with the infantry the artillery 
implemented a relay barrage:
Of ten brigades supporting the 4th 
Division, only six fired the barrage 
up to the first objective, while the 
other four moved forward. Eight 
brigades fired the barrage to the 
second objective, four from their 
original locations plus the four that 
had just moved forward. Meanwhile, 
two brigades joined the latter, and 
these six then fired the barrage to the 
third objective.59
In essence, the artillery employed 
an unorthodox method of “leap-
frogging” in order to maintain the 
effectiveness of the creeping barrage 
and provide cover for the infantry. 
As Currie explained:
The provision of an effective Artillery 
barrage presented considerable 
difficulty owing to the depth of the 
attack and its general direction. On 
the 4th Canadian Division front 
particularly, the depth to the initial 
objectives was such that the batteries 
were compelled to move forward 
into captured ground and continue 
firing the barrage from these new 
positions. Provision was made for 
the advance of a number of batteries 
with their Echelons to the Canal line 
and beyond whilst the attack was in 
progress.60
 Covering fire for the infantry 
was only one of the artillery’s tasks. 
There was also the requirement for 
“counter battery” fire to destroy, or at 
least suppress, the enemy’s artillery. 
The Canadian Corps had developed 
a powerful counter-battery capability 
since early 1917 under the leadership 
of Lieutenant-Colonel McNaughton, 
the counter-battery staff officer. In 
McNaughton’s words, “The primary 
object of all Counter Battery work 
is the protection of the infantry 
from the fire of the hostile artillery. 
Inflicting casualties on the enemy, 
breaking their morale or destroying 
his materials are merely means to an 
end. Counter Battery Work depends 
for success on the correct application 
of sufficient fire.”61 
 The key to successful counter-
battery operations was the ability 
of McNaughton’s staff to accurately 
locate enemy batteries prior to the 
attack, so that at zero hour the 
heavy guns assigned to the counter 
battery role could blanket the enemy 
batteries with fire. Information about 
the enemy positions was acquired 
by air observation, reports from 
reconnaissance parties, captured 
d o c u m e n t s ,  i n t e r r o g a t i o n  o f 
prisoners, and two methods the 
scientifically minded McNaughton 
did much to promote and develop, 
flash spotting and sound ranging. 
Flash spotting involved the use 
of several observation posts with 
surveying equipment that reported 
the location of flashes when the enemy 
guns fired; mathematical calculations 
based on this data could pinpoint the 
positions of the guns quite accurately 
in good conditions. Sound ranging 
used similar techniques, but with 
the data being supplied by arrays of 
microphones that gave bearings on 
the sound of a gun’s discharge. As 
historian Gary Sheffield writes, “The 
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evolution of the BEF’s artillery, from 
the unscientific and ‘rule of thumb’ 
approach of 1914 to the distinctly 
scientific and highly accurate gunnery 
of 1918 was the factor, more than any 
other, that brought about victory.”62 
 Artillery support during the 
Hundred Days was exceedingly 
effective, and the operations on 27 
September marked a high point in 
cooperation between the artillery and 
infantry. Aided by the engineers, the 
artillery was able to continually push 
forward maintaining their covering 
fire for the advancing infantry. 
“Two guns of the 1st Battery C.F.A. 
gave the 1st Brigade a good start by 
moving in front of Inchy-en-Artois 
and firing point-blank into enemy 
positions along the canal. Thus aided, 
the 4th Battalion, having crossed the 
dry bed with little difficulty, was 
able to jump ahead to the north-east 
and capture its assigned portion of 
the Marquion Line.”63 The Canadian 
artillery’s official history records 
that “The achievement of that arm 
in successfully dealing with the 
unique conditions arising from the 
unusual depth to which the initial 
attacks penetrated may be said to 
have surpassed in sound planning 
and brilliant execution anything 
previously accomplished by the 
Canadian Corps.”64
 McNaughton’s counter-battery 
group per formed the i r  most 
magnificent feat of the war, with 
“an intense neutralization of hostile 
battery positions.”65 As the war diary 
for the Canadian heavy artillery 
explains, “the batteries of the counter-
battery brigades were moved by 
sections into their positions…where 
they remained silent until the opening 
of the barrage. The attack took the 
enemy completely by surprise and all 
objectives were gained.”66 Prior to the 
Canadian assault the Germans had 
quietly manoeuvred 230 guns into the 
vicinity of the Bourlon Wood. This 
potentially devastating concentration 
of enemy guns withheld its fire 
in the hope of escaping detection, 
but 80 percent of the guns were 
destroyed within the first minutes of 
the attack. Counter-battery officers 
had located 113 of these guns prior to 
the battle and McNaughton’s artillery 
eliminated them.67 In contrast to the 
roar of the Canadian guns at zero 
hour, “the German reply was almost 
non-existent. This was due to the 
brilliance of the Canadian counter-
battery fire, which was never more 
effective than in this operation.”68 
 Much as the highly effective 
integration of the engineers and 
artillery into a combined arms assault 
contributed to the Canadian Corps’ 
greatest victory on the Western Front, 
their whole purpose was to facilitate 
the infantry’s advance. By 1918, 
the Canadian Corps had, drawing 
on its own experience and that of 
other British and French formations, 
organized its infantry into heavily 
armed small units, capable of rapid 
manoeuvre and concentration of 
firepower. The platoon sized assault 
units featured newer weapons such 
as light machine guns, bombs, rifle-
grenades and light mortars, each 
served by specialists. Advances by 
full companies or battalions in line 
had been abandoned in favour of 
more flexible assault formations, 
applied by each platoon in accordance 
with the conditions it encountered.69 
Full information on the objectives 
and the resistance expected was 
provided to all, including the lowest 
ranking soldiers, so that they would 
understand their role in the operation, 
and could intelligently apply the 
more flexible tactics. 
 Even with the advancements 
in weapons and tactics the casualty 
numbers were staggering. According 
to Rawling, the Canal du Nord 
operation equalled Passchendaele in 
the percentage of lives lost.70 In three 
days of operations, from the crossing 
of the canal to the capture of Bourlon 
Wood Canadian casualties numbered 
approximately 2,500. In the entire 
operation for the Canal du Nord 
and the heights around Cambrai 
casualties numbered 13,672. Rawling 
points out that “Even in the last three 
months the evolving technology of 
Allied leaders meet on the front steps 
of the Cambrai city hall in October 
1918. The group includes Field Marshal 
Sir Douglas Haig (third from left); 
Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng 
(fourth from left); and French prime 
minister Georges Clemenceau (third 
from right).
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war could not drastically reduce 
casualties.”71 Thus, although the 
Canal du Nord stands as a remarkable 
operation in terms of combined-arms 
tactics and feats of engineering it was 
also one of the bloodiest Canadian 
operations of the war. One measure 
of the intensity of the combat is that 
eight Victoria Crosses were awarded 
to members of the Canadian Corps 
for actions between 27 September and 
11 October. 
 German casualties during the 
same period are unknown, but it is 
estimated that the Canadian Corps 
faced approximately 31 divisions 
during this period, more than any 
other Allied corps on the front line.72 
The Canadians captured over 18,000 
prisoners, 371 guns and howitzers, 
and nearly 2,000 machine guns.73 The 
crossing of the Canal du Nord made 
possible the capture of the vital rail 
centre of Cambrai which in turn led to 
the ultimate withdrawal of two entire 
German Army groups and the loss 
of their last fully developed defence 
line. 
 Currie’s daring and unorthodox 
plan was implemented with great 
success. The tactical doctrine of 
combined-arms attack integrated 
with set piece and limited objective 
battle plans led to a remarkably 
effective operation.74 As Schreiber 
states, “Whereas both Amiens and 
Vimy were simple frontal attacks, 
the Canal du Nord incorporated risk 
and manoeuvre, belying the popular 
myth that all major BEF attacks on the 
Western Front were unimaginative 
and predictable.”75 The narrow 
crossing of the canal followed by a 
widening of the front constituted 
an extremely complicated corps 
manoeuvre. A further significant 
aspect of the Canal du Nord was 
the effective use of engineers who 
provided the highest possible 
mobility to both the artillery and 
infantry. Since the reformation of the 
engineer corps, there had been no 
opportunity to employ them at full 
strength. The crossing of the Canal 
du Nord provided this opportunity 
and allowed Currie and his engineers 
to prove the new organization. These 
achievements made the crossing of 
the Canal du Nord an exceptional and 
historically important action. After 
the breaching of the Hindenburg 
line the German army began to fight 
a series of small rear-guard actions 
as the bulk of their army continually 
withdrew in the face of the advancing 
Allied armies. For the Canadians, 
the Canal du Nord was the last 
major offensive, although they were 
to continually encounter German 
resistance to the last day of the war. 
 The Hundred Days campaign 
must be studied within the context of 
the evolution of warfare throughout 
the First World War. Rawling 
provides an effective framework 
in order to do this.76 He divides 
the war into two phases, the first 
phase ending at the conclusion 
of the Somme offensive and the 
second phase carrying through to 
the end of the war. The first phase 
represented a gradual break from 
traditional military doctrine while the 
second phase witnessed a synthesis 
of military thought creating an 
efficient doctrine incorporating 
various new technologies and ideas. 
This phase witnessed a more rapid 
shift towards modern military 
concepts including mass use of 
engineer units, implementation 
of newer technologies, small unit 
infantry tactics of fire and movement, 
combined-arms assault techniques 
and a return to mobility on the 
battlefield. The Canal du Nord was a 
benchmark in all these developments, 
the precursors of the most successful 
approaches to combat in the Second 
World War.
 During the Hundred Days, the 
Canadians spearheaded the most 
successful Allied offensive of the 
entire war. They fought through 
23 miles of German-held territory, 
overcame numerous  German 
defences including the formidable 
Drocourt-Quéant l ine and the 
nearly impenetrable Canal du Nord. 
They liberated 116 square miles of 
French territory while encountering 
and defeating numerous German 
divisions. The Canal du Nord 
crossing was the apogee of this 
remarkable Canadian achievement. 
Three wounded but cheery Canadian 
soldiers grab a bite to eat at an advanced 
dressing station during the Cambrai 
battle, October 1918.
Ca
na
di
an
 W
ar
 M
us
eu
m
 1
99
30
01
2-
77
0
15
Borys: Crossing the Canal
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011
38
Notes
1. See Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: 
Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-
1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1992.); Shane B. Schreiber, Shock 
Army of the British Empire: The Canadian 
Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997); Tim Cook, 
Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great 
Way, 1917-1918 (Toronto: Viking Canada, 
2008).
2. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.110.
3. An estimated 45,000 Canadian casualties.
4. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.96.
5. Daniel G. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory: 
Canada and the Great War (Edmonton: 
Hurtig Publishers, 1987), pp.127-8.
6. Library and Archives Canada [LAC], War 
Diary, 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
October 1918, Mikan no.2005784.
7. Arthur Currie, Canadian Corps Operations 
During the Year 1918 (Ottawa: Department 
of Militia and Defence, 1919), p.55.
8. G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force: 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 
and Controller of Stationery, 1964), p.442.
9. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
p.443.
10. A.M.J Hyatt, The Military Career of Sir 
Arthur Currie (Michigan: University 
Microfilms, 1967), p.229.
11. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.98.
12. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.132.
13. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.57.
14. LAC, War Diary, 12th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, October 1918, Mikan no.2005874.
15. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.98.
16. Don Farr, The Silent General, Horne of the 
First Army: A Biography of Haig’s Trusted 
Great War Comrade-In-Arms (London: 
Helion and Company Ltd., 2006); Mark 
Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir 
Arthur Currie (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS 
Press of Wilfrid Laurier University, 2008).
17. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.99.
18. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.59.
19. Hyatt, The Military Career of Sir Arthur 
Currie, p.231.
20. Canon Frederick George Scott, The Great 
War As I Saw It (Vancouver: The Clarke 
and Stuart Co. Limited, 1934), p.309.
21. LAC, War Diary, 12th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, October 1918. 
22. Ibid.
23. LAC, War Diary, 4th Canadian Division, 
September 1918, Mikan no.1883120.
24. LAC, War Diary, 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, October 1918. 
25. LAC, War Diary, 1st Canadian Division, 
September 1918, Mikan no.2034166.
26. Dancocks, p.141.
27. LAC, War Diary, 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, October 1918, Mikan no.2005784.
28. Ibid.
29. LAC, War Diary, 7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, October 1918. Mikan no.2005839
30. Arthur Currie, The Canadian Corps and its 
Part in the War. (Speech given in 1920.), 
p.7.
31. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.58
32. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.110.
33. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.19.
34. Schreiber gives an excellent comparative 
analysis between the Canadian Corps and 
a standard BEF Corps.
35. A.G.L. McNaughton, The Development of 
Artillery in the Great War: Counter Battery 
Work: The Capture of Valenciennes: Machines 
and the Weapons of War: Trend of Army 
Organisation With Particular Reference 
to Recent Engineering Developments 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller 
of Stationary, 1933), p.7
36. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.140.
37. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.210.
38. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.24.
39. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.145.
40. A.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill, The History 
of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers: 
Volume 1- 1749-1939 (Toronto: Thorn 
Press, 1962), p.284.
41. Ibid., p.191. 
42. LAC, War Diary, 1st Brigade Canadian 
Engineers ,  October  1918 ,  Mikan 
no.2004864.
43. LAC, War Diary, 3rd Battalion Canadian 
Engineers, September 1918, Mikan 
no.2005994.
44. LAC, War Diary, 1st Brigade Canadian 
Engineers ,  October  1918 ,  Mikan 
no.2004864.
45. LAC, War Diary, 10th Battalion Canadian 
Engineers, September 1918, Mikan 
no.2006002.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. LAC, War Diary, 1st Brigade Canadian 
Engineers, October 1918. 
49. LAC, War Diary, 3rd Battalion Canadian 
Engineers, September 1918. 
50. LAC, War Diary, 12th Battalion Canadian 
Engineers, September 1918, Mikan 
no.2006003.
51. LAC, War Diary,  Chief  Engineer 
Canadian Corps, September 1918, Mikan 
no.2005982.
52. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.63.
53. McNaughton, The Development of Artillery 
in the Great War, p.12.
54. Ibid.
55. Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western 
Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 
1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994), p.142.
56. McNaughton, The Development of Artillery 
in the Great War, p.10.
57. LAC, War Diary, 1st Canadian Division, 
September 1918, Mikan no.2005715.
58. Donald Fraser, The Journal of Private Fraser: 
Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918 
(Nepean: CEF Books, 1985), p.265.
59. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.210.
60. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.58.
61. McNaughton, The Development of Artillery 
in the Great War, p.14.
62. G.D. Sheffield, “How Even Was the 
Learning Curve? Reflections on the 
British and Dominion Armies on the 
Western Front,” contained in Yves 
Tremblay, ed., Canadian Military History 
Since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the 
Canadian Military History Conference, 
Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000 (Ottawa: National 
Defence, 2000), p.126.
63. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
p.446.
64. G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: 
The History of the Royal Regiment of 
Canadian Artillery, Volume 1: 1534-
1919 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1967), p.356.
65. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Corps 
Heavy Artillery, October 1918, Mikan 
no.2004789.
66. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Corps 
Heavy Artillery, September 1918, Mikan 
no.2004789.
67. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.136.
68. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.136.
69. One example was the worm formation. 
One soldier would be in the lead and the 
others would be behind in a curved, linear 
formation, much like that of a worm 
moving along the ground.
70. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.221.
71. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.215.
72. Rawling argues that the Canadian Corps 
faced 31 divisions where as Schreiber 
argues that the Corps actually faced 
remnants of 68 divisions.
73. Hyatt, The Military Career of Sir Arthur 
Currie, p.234.
74. Eight tanks were also allotted to the 
Canadian Corps however they proved 
mechanically unreliable and much too 
slow to play any significant part in the 
Canadian advance.
75. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
p.110.
76. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.221.
David Borys is a PhD candidate at the 
University of New Brunswick under the 
tutelage of Dr. Marc Milner. His soon to be 
completed dissertation, titled “Collateral 
Damage: Canadian Civil Affairs in North-
West Europe,” examines the work of 
the men of First Canadian Army Civil 
Affairs in Northern France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands and explores the myriad 
of challenges that faced the relatively 
unknown organization. He completed 
his Masters at the University of Alberta 
completing a dissertation on Sir Arthur 
Currie titled “The Education of a Corps 
Commander: Arthur Currie from 1915-
1917.”
16
Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss4/3
